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In th.e Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHN G. MATIEVITCH, 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 8281 
HERCULES POWDER CO., 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This was an action brought as a result of a premature explo-
sion in blasting by the use of caps and dynamite. That prior to 
the time of trial the counsel for the defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, which judgment was granted by the District 
Court and from which summary judgment (R. 45) the plaintiff 
now appeals. 
The plaintiff was employed at the time of the explosion 
as a powder man by the Utah Portland Cement Company in 
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their LeGrand quarry in Parley's Canyon in Salt Lake Count, 
Utah, (R. 26 and R. 15). 
On January 9, 1951, the date of the explosion, the plaintiff 
was preparing the charges which broke up the rocks which 
had been blasted from the quarry~ by loading powder in the 
holes drilled in the rocks (R. 29). The plaintiff had placed 
a cap and a stick of dynamite in the hole prepared by the drill-
ers, who had preceeded him, and before he had completed 
the process, in fact, just as he put the dynamite in the hole, 
which hole was eight to twelve inches deep, the dynamite 
being eight inches long, the cap and dynamite blew up (R. 36). 
The plaintiff was horribly injured, being blinded in both 
eyes, having one arm blown off just below the wrist, one arm 
lacerated and cut, and both legs injured. 
The plaintiff had worked for the Portland Cement Com-
pany in the quarry from 1936 to 1942 (R. 25). He started 
working for the Company again in 1949 and was working for 
them until the accident occurred (R. 26). The plaintiff had 
worked with the powder men from 1936 to 1942 and part of 
the time as powder man himself and from July 1949 to 
January 9, 1951 had worked as powder man and drilled with 
the powder crew (R. 27). 
At the time of the explosion, the plaintiff was using caps 
and dynamite furnished to the Utah Portland Cement Com-
pany by the Hercules Powder Company (R. 1, 11, and 16) 
and loaded the particular hole with the cap and dynamite 
in exactly the same manner which he had always done and 
which, in his many years at the quarry, had been done by all 
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other powder men (R. 16) and in accordance with instructions 
given him by his supervisors and persons training him. 
On numerous and sundry occasions representatives of the 
Hercules Powder Company had watched the plaintiff and 
other powder men load holes in exact! y the same manner as 
the hole was loaded on January 9, 1951, and had never dis-
approved of the method, questioned it, or asked them to change 
in any way (R. 16 and R. 36). 
The plaintiff prepared the caps himself and opened the 
original package containing the dynamite and the powder caps 
and they were both in the original packages, still sealed as 
they came from the manufacturer. The plaintiff had read all 
of the cautions in times past and knew the contents thereof 
set forth in the packages of powder and caps as shown at R. 14 
and had not on this morning done anything which he was 
warned against, but had followed his usual procedure. 
At the time the motion for summary judgment was made 
the counsel for the plaintiff conceded that there was no direct 
evidence as to the composition of the cap and dynamite as 
all the evidence was destroyed in the explosion and that it 
would be impossible to prove from the powder and cap itself 
the negligence or the failure of the defendant to manufacture 
the caps and dynamite in a safe and satisfactory manner. 
The plaintiff stated that he was relying on indirect evi-
dence and circumstances to prove the negligence of the de-
fendant company and the theory of res ipsa loquitur to support 
his position. Two affidavits were filed by powder men other 
than the plaintiff (see Rudelick and Harwood affidavits (R. 15 & 
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20) who had worked in this particular rock quarry, one of them 
having been a powder man for many years, . and having been 
trained by the government in the proper manner of handling 
powder (R. 20) From the affidavits and other evidence it was 
clear that the plaintiff had done nothing himself to cause the ex-
plosion. Louis Rudelich, as an expert, stated that it was his 
opinion that the only possible cause of the explosion of the 
dynamite and cap in this particular case would be that the cap 
and/or the dynamite was defectively manufactured (R. 22). 
In spite of the direct expert opinion evidence the court 
held that there had to be direct evidence to show the negligence 
of the defendant and granted the summary judgment. 
The counsel for the plaintiff stated that other evidence 
would be introduced showing the acts of the plaintiff could 
not have caused the explosion and evidence to show that caps 
or dynamite manufactured in the usual manner and standard 
could not be made to explode under the circumstances in this 
case. 
In considering this case, it should be kept in mind that 
the full case of the plaintiff has definitely not been put on 
and all of the proof and evidence are certainly not in, but as 
. the evidence to be presented was rather indirect, the court 
allowed the motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION 
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1. There was a disputed fact as to the negligence of the 
defendant which should have been allowed to go to the jury. 
2. There was direct expert opinion evidence shown 
in the affidavit by qualified witnesses to support the disputed 
facts. 
3. The facts and contentions of the plaintiff, if true, 
created a prima faci case and the court erred by not allowing 
the plaintiff to prove it by circumstantial evidence and let 
the jury decide the question. 
4. That even if the plaintiff could not prove his case by 
direct or circumstantial evidence, the case still should be tried 
and permitted to go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THERE WAS A DISPUTED FACT AS TO THE NEG-
LIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WHICH SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GO TO THE JURY. 
It is a well known fact and recognized beyond argument 
that in all cases where there is a disputed fact that the case 
should be permitted to go to the jury for the jury to decide. 
In a motion for summary judgment it is the law that all 
the evidence, pleadings, and affidavits of the party opposing 
the motion for summary judgment should be construed in a 
light most favorable to the party so opposing. It would seem 
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that this had not been done in this particular case or the motion 
would have been denied. 
In the instant case there was a direct dispute in the alleged 
negligence as it was alleged in complaint (R. 1, 2, and 3) 
and. denied in the answer (R. 7, 18, and 19) . Inasmuch as 
the dispute in the pleadings is clear, it would leave the decision 
to be based on the £eight of the evidence which will be dis-
cussed further. 
The motion for summary judgment was made under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, which is 
practically an exact take off on the U. S. Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure for summary judgments, also numbered Rule 56. A 
study of the U. S. Rule supports the contentions of the plaintiff 
herein. This is set 1orth in the United States Code Annotated, 
Vol. 28, Rule 56, Note 4 and the following: Lincoln Electric 
Company vs. Knox (1944) 56 Federal ~upplement 308: 
((This rule was never intended to throw on the court 
the burden of determining a case involving a delicate 
question of the law, complicated and controverted 
facts, without an adequate and proper hearing." 
It further states in Chemical Foundation vs. Universal Cyclops 
( 1942) 2 F.R.D. 283: 
((It was not the intention of this rule relating to Sum-
mary Judgment that a case should be tried by Affidavit 
as a substitute for trial in the usual way in open court 
where the right of cross-examination exists.'' 
Page 14 of the above cited volume states: 
CCA summary judgment s~ould never be given until 
the facts are clear and undisputed, and if there is any 
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(emphasis supplied) controversy on a factual question 
judgment should be withheld until proof is made." 
U.S.C.A. Vol. 28, Rule 56, Note 9, Page 155 states: 
(<Under this rule, summary judgment is authorized 
only where it affirmatively appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file that ex-
cept as to the amount of damages there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the mover is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Citing from the same Rule, Ryan vs. Broderick, 56 Federal 
Supplement, 189 ( 1945) states: 
nA motion for summary judgment cannot be made a 
substitute for a trial either before a court or a jury, 
and a plaintiff who states a cause of action which en-
title him to a trial by jury is entitled to have his case 
tried in that way and cannot be compelled to submit 
his evidence in the form of affidavits in resistance to 
a motion for summary judgment.'' 
It would seem very clear from the above citations that the 
District Judge had erred in granting the motion for summary 
judgment as there is no question as to the dispute in the record 
and there is absolutely nothing in the record to show the actual 
cause of the explosion, and the jury should be entitled to find 
the real cause. The only thing in opposition to the plaintiff's 
theory that the defendant was negligent in manufacture was 
the very nebulous statement that dynamite is dangerous and 
should be handled carefully. 
It is still going to have to be decided just exactly what 
did happen to cause the accident. The plaintiff's theories and 
the defendant's other theories have not been placed in evidence. 
<) 
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It would seem that the court by its ruling is compelling 
or will compel each and every plaintiff to present all of his evi-
dence in the form of depositions or affidavits so that everything 
could be examined before the trial, contrary to · the general 
intent and interpretation of Rule 56, and that the trial court 
has passed judgment prematurely. This is supported by Begnaud 
vs. White (1948) 170 F. 2d 323: 
((The Trial Judge should be slow in passing upon the 
motion for Summry Judgment which would deprive 
party of right to trial by jury where the material fact 
is disputed." 
To allow the ruling to stand in the present case would 
practically do away with trials except in cases where there is 
actual direct evidence of eye witnesses. 
POINT NO. II 
THERE WAS DIRECT OPINION EVIDENCE 
SHOWN IN THE AFFIDAVIT BY QUALIFIED WIT-
NESSES TO SUPPORT THE DISPUTED FACT. 
The court erred in ignoring the opinion evidence of Louis 
Rudelich, who was qualified as an expert as shown by his affi-
davit. Instead of assuming that the explosion was the result 
of a defective cap or dynamite as the court was bound to do 
in considering the motion, the court entirely ignored the opinion 
evidence of Louis Rudelich, who seems to have been the most 
qualified of any person shown in the record to say what caused 
the accident. The direct conclusion of Mr. Rudelich is that 
10 
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the explosion could not have been caused by anything except 
defective materials furnished by the defendant (R. 22). 
It is such a well established fact under the law that experts 
are allowed to express their opinion even though they cannot 
testify directly as to the actual occurrence, that it would seem to 
be specious to argue the point. However, it seems to have been 
ignored in this instance. From the record in a number of powder 
cases which have been reported, opinion evidence was used 
in similar situations where the actual evidence was just as nebu-
lous and indirect as it is in the present case. 
This was true in th ecase of Morris vs. E. I. Dupont Ne 
Mours, ( 193 7) 109 S. W. 1222, and Hopkins vs. E. I. Dupant 
Ne Mours, ( 1952) 199 Fed. 2d 930. In this latter case, 
opinion evidence of an expert was clearly allowed both for the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and the court, from its opinion, 
very clearly recognized the expert opinion of a man trained 
by practical experience over the years, such as is the case with 
Mr. Rudelich. This case will be cited further. 
From the above it would seem clear that without any 
further evidence, except the statement of Mr. Rudelich, this 
motion should have been denied. 
POINT III 
THAT THE FACTS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, IF TRUE, CREATED A PRIMA FACI CASE 
AND THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO PROVE IT BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE AND THE JURY DECIDE THE QUESTION. 
11 
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The court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to prove his 
contentions by the use of circumstantial evidence. With respect 
to circumstantial evidence as proof of a fact, attention is called 
to Volume 20, Am. Jur., Section 271: 
c cThe competency of circumstantial evidence is not 
open to question, provided it is the best evidence which 
the nature of the case admits, or its use is not prevented 
by a binding contractual provision which excludes use 
of circumstantial evidence arises either from the nature 
of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, consider-
able latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstan-
tial evidence. No evidence should be excluded of any 
fact or circumstance connected with the principal trans-
- action in dispute from which an inference as to the 
truth of irrelevancy are not favored for the reason that 
the force and effect of circumstantial facts usually and 
almost necessarily depend upon ·their connection with 
each other. However, a fact is admissible as a basis 
of an inference only where the desired inference is 
of an interference only where the desired inference is 
a probable or natural explanation of the fact and a more 
probable and natural one than other explanations, if 
any. 
The attorney for the plaintiff calls attention to the case 
of Park vs. Moorman Manufacturing Company (1952) 241 
Pac. 2nd, 914, which was tried by this attorney. That was 
a case of chickens dying from use of feed, and in that case there 
was absolutely no direct evidence to show that the manu-
facturer was negligent in the manufacturing of the feed, and 
it was admitted that the feed which was purported to have 
caused the death had no deleterious or poisonous substances 
and was constituted exactly as represented by the manufacturer, 
and that the feed in and of itself could not kill the chickens. 
12 
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During the course of the trial, there were many other reasons 
shown why the death of the chickens involved could have 
been the result of numerous and sundry other factors and ill-
nesses rather than the feed in question. However, it was sub-
mitted to the jury and even though there was no direct evi-
dence, judgment was obtained and was unanimously upheld 
by the Utah Supreme Court in 1952. The case is being reported 
and annotated in the A. L. R., second series. 
With respect to circumstantial evidence and its proof it 
comes very close to involving the theory of res ipsa loquitur, 
as res ipsa liquitur is based somewhat on circumstances and 
inferences. 
However, the Pennsylvania case of Hopkins vs. E. I. 
Dupont Ne Mours, .199 Fed. 2d 930, was based strictly on 
circumstantial evidence, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was not considered, as the court of Pennsylvania has previously 
held that res ipsa loquitur does' not apply in explosion cases. 
In this case, the plaintiff's husband was drilling bore holes 
about six feet deep which were to be filled with dynamite, 
and at the time of the filling, another drill was operating 
within five feet of the hole. Defendant's expert testified that 
the explosion was caused by heat and/ or vibration from the 
drilling in the adjacent hole. The court cited Maize vs. Atlantic 
Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, stating that the Maize case stands 
for the proposition that one who supplies an instrumentality 
for the use by others and who knows or should know that the 
foreseeable ·use is dangerous for human life unless certain 
precautions are taken and who realize or should realize that 
13 
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the probable user will not recognize the danger is under a duty 
to warn of such danger and to advise the proper precautions. 
Quoting the Hopkins vs. N e Mours case, the court stated, 
the defendants 
c c • • • attempted to pary the thrust of the Maize case 
by saying it is inapplicable here. Defendant tells us 
that everybody knows that dynamite is dangerous and 
there is no need to warn against the obvious, but the 
plaintiff's theory does not go to the generally dangerous 
character of the dynamite." 
Says everyone should know that dynamite should not be 
thrown in the fire, but construction workers don't know that 
heat or vibration of drilling will cause an explosion and should 
be warned of the danger. The case further shows that the 
defendant was warned by publishing the safety list of 63 
ndo'n'ts" (apparently the same 63 ((don'ts" as shown in the 
affidavit of L. W. Early, R. 13) and that item No. 21 warns 
against loading the final charge in a sprung hole until it is 
cooled off. The court said, however, there was no warning 
about the new hole. The defendant claimed there was no 
competent proof by the plaintiff as to the actual happening 
and no proof of negligence from the mere happening of the 
event, but the court stated: 
tCPROOF TO A DEGREE OF MATHEMATICAL 
PRECISION IS NOT REQUIRED." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
And ·it further states: 
t CThat it is not the rule that circumstantial evidence 
need exclude everything which the ingenuity of counsel 
may suggest as having caused or contributed to death.'' 
14 
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In the Hopkins vs. Ne Mours case, the lower court had 
found in favor of the defendant, based on lack of direct evi-
dence, but the Federal Court reversed it and found for the 
plaintiff. 
In the .Nforris vs. E. I. Dupont Ne Mours (previously 
cited) the drill holes were in clay and the holes were four 
feet deep and were loaded by pushing the dynamite and cap 
in with the tamping stick and there was a prematu~e explosion. 
In the trial of this case, the judgment was given to the 
defendant, based on what was later admitted to be erroneous 
instructions to the jury. However, in arguing the case, to the 
Appellate Court, the defendant contended that it did not make 
any difference whether or not the instructions were erroneous, 
~ 
as the plaintiff had not made out a submissible case, and con-
sequently the correctness or incorrectness of the instructions 
would have no bearing on the liability of the defendant. The 
Court agreed that the plaintiff would have no claim if a sub-
missible case had not been made. The defendant further con-
tended that the cause of the premature explosion was strictly 
a matter of circumstantial evidence and conjecture (emphasis 
supplied) and that there was no direct evidence to show the 
real cause of the explosion. The Court held that there was cir-
cumstantial evidence and that a number of inferences might 
be drawn as to the cause of the explosion but that even though 
several inferences might be drawn, the plaintiff had made out 
a submissible case and the inferences could be concentrated 
(emphasis supplied) and become basis for final liability. The 
case was reversed and remanded. 
From the foregoing cases and the rules set forth therein, 
15 
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it would seem clear that the plaintiff should be allowed to 
show all of the surrounding circumstances and facts concern-
ing the actual explosion and the defendant be allowed to show 
any· circumstances or theory which they have which might ex-
plain the explosion and then permit the jury to determine the 
actual cause of the accident. 
To refuse to permit the jury to determine these facts was 
error and the motion for summary judgment should have been 
denied. 
POINT NO. IV 
THAT EVEN IF ·THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT 
PROVE HIS CASE BY DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE, THE CASE SHOULD BE TRIED AND PER-
MITTED TO GO TO THE JURY ON THE THE.ORY OF 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The theory of res ipsa loquitur-meaning the thing speaks 
for itself-has been applied in numerous explosion cases simi-
lar in nature to the case at hand and should have been applied 
in this case. If res ipsa loquitur is allowed in this case, the 
plaintiff would only be required to show that he was free from 
negligence in the handling of the caps and dynamite. After it 
was shown that he was free from negligence, the jury could 
infer that there had been negligence on the part of the manu-
facturer from the fact of the explosion itself. 
In the early application of the doctrine, a number of juris-
dictions established the theory that the defendant, at the time 
of the accident had to have an actual physical control of the 
16 
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object which caused the injury. These cases are practically 
universally outmoded in the present tr~nd, which will be seen 
from the cases cited and the rules set forth therein. It is now 
almost universally recognized that if the manufacturer, the 
defendant, was negligent even though the particular item 
which caused the injury passed through many hands if the 
item was not changed but remained in the same state as when 
it left the control of the manufacturer and the plaintiff does 
nothing to contribute to the accident, then the theory of res 
ipsa loquitur applies. 
Utah recognizes the res ipsa loquitur theory as is clearly 
shown in the cases decided by the Supreme Court. The de-
fendant relied on the case of Jordan vs. Coca Cola Bottling 
Company, (Utah 1950) 218 Pac. 2d 660, to support its posi-
tion. In thise case the injury arose from the alleged swallowing 
of a fly in a bottle of Coca Cola which was served out of a 
dispensing machine in Magna. The court very clearly recog-
nized the theory of res ipsa loquitur and set forth the respon-
sibility of the manufacturer to third persons who were injured 
by their products. The court stated that there were four classes 
of packaged items, the first being where the packaged articles 
pass directly from the manufacturer to the consumer, and 
the second classification being where the package or bottle 
comes to the consumer so sealed as food and drink in cans, 
or otherwise so constructed that its contents reached the con-
sumer without possibility of change by intermediate parties. 
The court stated: 
((In both cases the facts clearly justify the application 
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The Court very clearly recognized that the instrumentality 
causing the injury did not need to be in the actual physical 
control of the defendant. The Court classified the instrumen-
talities into four classes, one of which was a manufactured 
product which was in the original package and there was no 
opportunity for interference with the product before the ulti-
mate consumption by the injured person. Then the instant 
case of the Coca Cola bottle, where the evidence showed there 
was a very strong and likely possibility of interference \Vith 
the product between the time of the manufacture and the time 
of the actual consumption. 
In this particular care, the Court stated that the evidence 
showed almost overwhelmingly that a fly could not leave 
the manufacturing plant of the defendant in the bottle after 
the inspection was made. There was also evidence that the cork 
on the bottle could be removed and a fly placed in the bottle 
without detection. Based on this evidence, the Court stated 
that there was not enough inference of negligence to allow 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur to apply. 
This was a 3-2 decision and the dissenting optnton set 
forth that it was straining probability too far to state that 
a fly had been put in after the bottle had left the plant as set 
forth by the rna jority. 
Applying these doctrines to the case at bar, the evidence 
will show that the powder and the caps were both in the 
original package and were opened at the time the charges 
were made and used the same day, and that there was no op-
portunity for tampering in the mean time. Hence, it would 
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come under the theory that it was in the original package 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur in the case of Stevens, Salt Lake City Incor-
porated vs. Wong, 259 Pac. 2d, 586. That was a suit to recover 
for the injury caused by a leaking water pipe. The plaintiff 
applied the theory of res ipsa loquitur for a leaking water pipe 
which had been placed in the building 12 years previously, 
which according to common knowledge, should have lasted 
the life of the building, but did not and caused a leak and 
damage. The cause was submitted to the jury on the theory 
of res ipsa loquitur and the jury found no cause of action. The 
plaintiff appealed on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled 
to a judgment, as a matter of law, based on the theory of res 
ipsa loquitur that without satisfactory explanation there was 
negligence. 
The Supreme Court held that res ipsa loquitur allows 
the fact finder to infer negligence from the happening of the 
event and in the absence of explanation might, in some in-
stances, compel the finding of negligence, but stated that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as matter of law from 
the mere happening of the event. The concurring opinion said 
that the circumstantial evidence of the negligence might be 
highly pursuasive and impelling but did not feel that the Court 
should go so far as to say that in any case the fact finder 
should be compelled to find negligence. 
There have been a number of explosion cases in which 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applied. Typical are ex-
plosions of bottled soda water, explosions of Pur ex cleaning 
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fluid, explosions of liquid preparations by paint companies, 
powder explosion cases, and even tire explosion cases. 
Probably one of the leading explosion cases setting forth 
the doctrine in a very full and complete manner is the case 
of Baker vs. Goodrich (Cal. 195 ;) 252 Pac. 2d 24. In this 
case, a tire exploded after it had been placed on a rim by an 
employee of B. F. Goodrich. This case was originally decided 
in favor of the defendant, but was reversed on appeal. The 
Court set forth three standards for testing the theory of res 
ipsa loquitur: 
n 1. The accident must be the kind that ordinarily does 
not occur in the absence of someone' s negligence. 
2. It must not have been due to any voluntary action 
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 
3. It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality 
within the exclusive control of the defendant." 
Applying these theories to the present case, we find that 
the explosion was definitely premature and could not have 
happened unless someone was negligent, nor the kind that 
ordinarily happens in the absence of someone's negligence 
(R. 16 & 39). The question of fact to be determined is as to 
whose negligence was the cause? 
With respect to the second item, there is no question that 
the instrumentality, the cap and the dynamite, was out of 
the physical control of the defendant at the time of the explo-
sion, so we must examine the cases to see whether or not this 
precludes recovery as contended by the defendants in this case. 
The Court, in Baker vs. B. F. Goodrich, states: 
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'(The requirement that the instrumentality in ques-
tion must have been within the exclusive control of 
the defendant before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is applicable does not require proof of such control 
by defendant at the time of the accident, but control 
at the time of the negligent act is sufficient under cer-
tain circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The court further stated that whether or not the manu-
facturer's evidence was sufficient to rebut the inference of 
negligence arising from the application of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur was for the jury and the District Court would 
not undertake such a determination. 
In this case the Court quoted from Escola vs. Coca 
Cola Bottling Company, (Cal. 1944) 150 Pac. 2d. In 
the Escola case, a bottle of Coca Cola blew up in a 
woman's hand, severe! y cutting her. She proved that 
there was no negligence on her part in handling the 
bottle and rested after announcing to the court that being 
unable to show any specific acts of negligence she relied com-
pletely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The court stated: 
((Many authorities state that the happening of the 
accident does not speak for itself where it took place 
some time after defendant had relinquished control of 
the instrumentality causing the injury. Under the more 
logical view, (emphasis supplied) however, the doc-
trine may be applied on the theory that the defendant 
had control at the time of the alleged negligent act 
although not at the time of the accident (emphasis 
supplied), provided plaintiff first proves the condition 
of the instrumentality had not been changed after it 
left the defendant's possession." 
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In suits for explosion of bottled soda water the appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur theory seems to be invoked by 
such a weight of authority as to be almost universal in appli-
cation. 
In the Baker vs. Goodrich case, the court also cited article 
({Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 3 7 California Law Review, 
183 and 201, as follows: 
((The plaintiff's mere possession of chattel which 
injures him does not prevent a res ipsa loquitur case 
where it is made clear that he had done nothing ab-
normal and has used the thing only for the purposes 
for which it was intended. The plaintiff need only 
tell enough of what he did and how the accident hap-
pened to permit the conclusion that the fault was not 
his. Again, he has the burden of proof by a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence and even though the ques-
tion of his own contribution is left in doubt, res ipsa 
loquitur may still be applied under the instruction 
to the jury.'' 
The Court also quoted from the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of the Boston & Maine Railroad 
Company vs. Jesionowski, 329 U. S. 452: 
((We cannot agree, that res ipsa loquitur thus ap-
plied, would bar juries from drawing an inference 
of negligence on account of unusual accidents in all 
operations where the injured person had himself par-
ticipated in the operation, even though it was proved 
that his operations of the things under his control did 
not cause the accident. This viewpoint unduly restricts 
the power of the Jury, and in this case, the Jury's right 
to draw inference from the evidence to support a ver-
dict and the sufficiency of that evidence to support a 
verdict. A conceptualistic doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
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has never been used by this Court to reduce the Jury's 
power to draw inferences from the facts. Such an in-
terpretation unduly narrows the doctrine as this Court 
applies it." 
In the Zentz vs. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 247 Pac. 
2d 344, res ipsa loquitur was permitted. This was a case of in-
jury received from ,an exploding bottle of Coca Cola where 
the plaintiff obtained a judgment below and it was affirmed 
and was based on the explosion of a bottle of Coca Cola and 
consequent injury. The Court stated: 
((The fact that the accident occurred some time after 
the defendant relinquished control of the instrumen-
tality which caused the accident does not preclude the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, provided there is evidence 
that the instrumentality has not been improperly 
handled by the plaintiff or some third person, or its con-
dition otherwise changed, after control was relinquished 
by the defendant; but it must appear that the defendant 
had sufficient control or connection with the accident 
that it can be said that he was more probably than not 
the person responsible for the plaintiff's in jury. 
((A person may properly rely upon the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur even though he has participated in 
events leading to the accident if the evidence excludes 
him as a responsible cause." 
In the case of Saprito vs. Purex (Cal. 1953) 255 Pac. 
2d 7, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied. This was 
a case of an exploding bottle of pur ex cleaner, an in jury 
being sustained from the explosion. In this case, the bottle had 
a special pressure release and a special warning to keep in a 
cool place, but the court upheld that the evidence that the 
bottle was not damaged or had been mistreated, permitted 
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the invoking of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and stated 
the fact of the mere explosion under the circumstances was 
sufficient to support the judgment of negligence. 
The plaintiff also calls attention to the Hopkins vs. E. I. 
Dupont Ne Mours case (previously cited) which was upheld 
purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. However, the 
separate opinion of the concurring judge was that they might 
just as well have gone off on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
With further respect to the control of the instrumentality, 
the Court in an Oregon case in 1950 of Gore vs. Multnomah 
Hotel, 224 Pac. 2d 55 2, set forth the proposition that under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff's mere possession 
of a chattel injuring him does not prevent a res ipsa loquitur 
case where it is clear that he has done nothing abnormal and 
has used the thing only for the purpose for which it was 
intended. 
In the argument 1n the District Court, the counsel for 
the defendant argued that the manufacturer should not be 
liable for items which have left its control and traveled 
through so many different hands. This, of course, has already 
been shown not to excuse the manufacturer. However, the 
manufacturer is specifically shown to have responsibility to 
third persons. This is set forth in the American Law Institute 
Restatement of Torts, Volume 2, Section 392-398, covers the 
responsibility of a manutfacturer to third persons, calling 
attention to Section 392, Page 1064, states: 
Chattel Dangerous For Intended Use 
nOne who supplies another directly or through a 
third person, a chattle to be used for the supplier's 
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business purposes is subject to liability to those for 
whose use the chattel is supplied for bodily harm 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
which and by persons for whose use the chattel is 
supplied 
a. if the supplier has failed to exercise reasonable 
care to make the chattel safe for which it is sup-
plied, or 
b. the supplier fails to give to those whom he 
should expect to use the chattel the informa-
tion required and the accident is due to the 
failure to exercise reasonable care to discover 
its dangerous character or condition." 
Also Section 395, Page 107;,: 
Negligent Manufacture 
t(A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable 
care in the manufacture or chattel, which unless care-
fully made he should recognize as involving an un-
reasonable risk causing substantial bodily harm to those 
who use it for the purpose for which it was manufac-
tured and to those whom the supplier should expect 
to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to 
liability for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful 
use in a manner and for a purpose for which it was 
manufactured." (See also 1074 and 1075). 
From this it is seen that the manufacturer is definitely 
liable to third persons who use the manufactured article and 
the more dangerous the article is likely to be in its ultimate 
use, the more care is required in the manufacture of the article, 
and contrary to the argument of counsel for defendant, those 
who handle the article do not assume the risk of any negligence 
of the manufacturer. The only assumption of risk in a dangerous 
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occupation is the assumption of normal hazards and not for 
any negligent manufacture or defective equipment, but only 
those risks which are inherent at all times. 
This theory is supported by Flint Explosion Company vs. 
Edwards, 66 S. E. 2d 368. This is a case of premature explosion 
of dynamite in the lighting of a fuse. In this case, it was sent 
back for a re-trial because the complaint was duplicitous in 
that plaintiff was pleading both ordinary negligence and wan-
ton negligence. However, the Court said in that case: 
UA manufacturer or seller of an article which is in-
herently and imminently dangerous to life, to health 
or becomes dangerous thereto when applied to its 
intended use in the usual and customary manner is 
liable to the buyer or third persons for injuries sus-
tained without his fault as a natural and proximate 
result of negligence in the manufacture. 
What constitutes due care by a manufacturer or 
dealer in manufacture or sale of articles which are in-
herently dangerous to human life or become dangerous 
thereto when applied to their intended use in the usual 
and customary manner varies with the danger inherent 
therein and a greater measure of care is necessary in 
dealing with explosives than ordinary products. 
In an action against the manufacturer or seller of 
dynamite and caps and allegedly defective fuse, for 
injuries to the buyer as a result of premature explosion, 
said defendants exercised due care, whether the manu-
facturer exercised measure of care adopted by explo-
sives industry generally and fixed by general trade 
custom in regulating and supervising personnel in the 
sale and distribution and use of explosives, and even, 
whether failure to do so was negligence, were fact 
. questions for the Jury." 
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In the case of Burr vs. Sherwin-Williams Company, (Cal. 
1953) 258 Pac. 2d 58, the theory of res ipsa loquitur was 
applied. The Court stated: 
~~The manufacture of an article which is inherent 
or imminently dangerous or which although not dan-
gerous in itself becomes so when applied to its intended 
use in the usual and customary manner is liable to 
any third person whether the purchaser or a third 
person who without fault on his part sustains an injury 
which is the natural and proximate result of negligence 
in the manufacture of the article, if the in jury might 
have reasonably been anticipated." 
In the powder explosion case, the defendant has tried 
to distinguish this from the other explosions cited on the 
theory that the dynamite was manufactured to explode and 
that it did exactly what it was supposed to do. 
However, it would seem that this could be no excuse or 
reason for not applying the doctrine, or reason for the excusing 
of a premature explosion as the powder is definitely dangerous 
and therefore the manufacturer has that much higher degree 
of responsibility placed upon him on it to see that the product 
is manufactured and only explode under the conditions for 
which it is manufactured and on no other occasion. 
It would seem to the plaintiff that if there was any assump-
tion of risk in an explosion, the assumption of risk would 
be on the part of the manufacturer, as the manufacturer has 
chosen to make his living in a business where there is some 
danger and it should not be excused from its negligence just 
because someone else had also ch?sen to work with powder. 
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In research, counsel has been unable to find any place 
or any case where the manufacturer or supplier has been 
excused from negligence in the manufacture of any article, 
no matter what its use was intended to be. 
There is a growing need and tendency for the broader 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as shown in the 
volume, ''Res Ipsa Loquitur-Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof" b_y Mark Shain. Quoting from Page 260 it states: 
']n these days of intensified and diversified indus-
trialism and mechanics, the· presumption res ipsa lo-
quitur, judiciously applied, is an invaluable medium 
and means for the lessening of litigation, saving ex-
pense to litigants and reducing the duration of trials." 
And from Page 261: 
((Plain common sense tells us that risks and injuries 
in every walk of life, which will concern all members 
of society, except the one hundred per cent recluse or 
hermit, must increase." 
Also on page 263: 
''When something breaks or explodes or seems to 
go berserk, and injures, maims or kills a few or many 
employees, patrons or others who are exposed to 
danger without fault on their part, and who have no 
possible means of either knowing or proving what 
caused the calamity ,-why should not that ownership 
and management which assumed responsibility and 
which, by every rule or reason, right, logic and equity, 
must know or be able to ascertain the true cause, be 
required to assume the burden of proof to explain 
and exculpate itself for negligence? 
Again, why should not the manufacturer or dis-
tributor of prepared foods or medicine which contain 
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deliterious or poisonous substances-or manufacturer 
of explosives-( the words ((or manufacturer of ex-
plosives" were inserted by counsel to point up the par-
ticular situation), or the person who permits a heavy 
object to drop from his upper window on a passer by, 
be required to establish, be a preponderance of the 
evidence, his freedom from negligence?" 
Mr. Shain further states on Page 275: 
''It is arbitrary, provincial and archaic to cling to the 
rule that the doctrine and principal of res ipsa loquitur 
may be invoked in passenger-carrier cases, only, and 
that, regardless of how completely the circumstances 
of a falling object, or a master and servant case, or of 
those involving food poisoning, defective machinery, 
or any one of almost innumerable other situations 
wherein state courts have found that the facts and 
surrounding conditions showed a typical res ipsa case, 
the eyes of the highest court in the land are closed and 
its ears are deaf to the appeal of the injured party for 
relief through that doctrine. To so hold in effect denies 
to all classes except one a protection of the law accorded 
to that one." 
As there has not been a case decided by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah on explosions, although the counsel is 
advised there is a tire explosion case pending, it would seem 
the application of the doctrine in this case could be very far 
reaching it the court fails to apply the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur. It would seem that all persons who went- injured by 
explosions where there can be no direct evidence would be 
precluded from all recovery. This would include any hunter 
who has a shell explode in his hand while he was handling 
it in an ordinary and normal fashion, any powder man who 
is injured no matter how negligent the manufacturer was 
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in the manufacture of the actual articles, and all the bottle 
cases. 
It would seem to counsel, as Mr. Shain points out, that 
this would be an unnecessary restriction and would impede 
progress and deny rights to parties injured. 
The cases hold that it is not necessary to show by evidence 
and preclude all possibility of an intervening cause, but only 
that it is reasonably certain that there has been no tampering 
or change of the instrumentality between the time of the pos-
session of the defendant and the time of the accident. 
It would seem clear that the fact that the defendant was 
manufacturing dynamite and caps to be used by third persons, 
knowing the very danger of the use, is rquired to use more 
than ordinary care. to inspect all of the materials supplied 
and to actually supply goods which are safe in every respect, 
when used in the ordinary manner for the purpose for which 
goods were manufactured. Here the evidence does show and 
will show that the dynamite and cap was used in the regular 
ordinary manner, in a manner known and approved by the 
defendant, for the purpose for which it was manufactured. 
In applying the doctrine as set forth in the latter cases 
of res ipsa loquitur, it would seem clear: 
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to have the evidence 
heard as to all the circumstances and facts surrounding the 
accident and submitted to the jury for its determination of 
actual facts. 
2. That the plaintiff, if he can reasonably prove that there 
has been no change in the powder and dynamite in the instant 
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case from the time that it left the factory until the time of 
the explosion and that nothing that he has done contributed 
or was the proximate cause of the accident, the plaintiff is 
entitled to invoke the theory of res ipsa loquitur, and the jury 
allowed to determine negligence. 
3. That is from all the evidence there can be a number 
of explanations even though based on inference and circum-
stantial evidence that the jury is entitled to consider all of 
the possible explanations and determine which, if any, of the 
possible explanations was the cause of the accident, and state 
the ultimate liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully represents to the Honorable 
Court that the summary judgment of the lower court was given 
in error and that the plaintiff should be allowed to place his 
evidence before the jury and have the jury determine the facts 
of the case and this Court should reverse and remand the case 
for that purpose. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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